Alternative Explanations for Changes in Similarity Judgments and MDS Structure by Johnson, Michael D et al.
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration
The Scholarly Commons
Articles and Chapters School of Hotel Administration Collection
8-1990
Alternative Explanations for Changes in Similarity
Judgments and MDS Structure
Michael D. Johnson
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration, mdj27@cornell.edu
Donald R. Lehmann
Columbia University
David A. Horne
University of Michigan
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles
Part of the Behavioral Economics Commons, and the Marketing Commons
This Article or Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Hotel Administration Collection at The Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of The Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
hlmdigital@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Johnson, M. D., Lehmann, D. R., & Horne, D. R. (1990). Alternative explanations for changes in similarity judgments and MDS
structure[Electronic version]. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, School of Hotel Administration site:
http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/683
Alternative Explanations for Changes in Similarity Judgments and MDS
Structure
Abstract
[Excerpt] The basic purpose of our paper ( Johnson et al., 1990) was to see if the repetitive task of providing
similarity judgments affects the cognitive structure evidenced by those judgments. The data clearly indicate
that the structure changed through the course of the task. Moreover, this change is consistent with a
categorization-based response to task fatigue. Three primary criticisms have been raised in response to our
paper (Malhotra, 1990): (1) fatigue is not directly measured, (2) our hypotheses do not follow from our
categorization framework, and (3) our hypotheses and findings are more consistent with a learning
framework.
Keywords
task repetition, fatigue, adaptation, learning
Disciplines
Behavioral Economics | Marketing
Comments
Required Publisher Statement
© Elsevier. Final version published as: Johnson, M. D., Lehmann, D. R., & Horne, D. R. (1990). Alternative
explanations for changes in similarity judgments and MDS structure. International Journal of Research in
Marketing , 7(1), 53–56. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
This article or chapter is available at The Scholarly Commons: http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/683
1 
 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR CHANGES IN SIMILARITY JUDGMENTS AND MDS 
STRUCTURE 
 
Michael D. Johnson 
Donald R. Lehmann 
Daniel R. Horne 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The basic purpose of our paper (Johnson et al., 1990) was to see 
if the repetitive task of providing similarity judgments affects the 
cognitive structure evidenced by those judgments. The data clearly 
indicate that the structure changed through the course of the task. 
Moreover, this change is consistent with a categorization-based 
response to task fatigue. Three primary criticisms have been raised in 
response to our paper (Malhotra, 1990): (1) fatigue is not directly 
measured, (2) our hypotheses do not follow from our categorization 
framework, and (3) our hypotheses and findings are more consistent 
with a learning framework. 
 
2. Task repetition and fatigue 
 
 Although indirect, our operationalization of fatigue is based on 
a fitting description of the subjects’ task environment. Similarity 
subjects to produce repeated judgments for familiar products or 
services. Two general factors may affect the subjects’ repeated 
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responses in this task environment, adaptation and fatigue. Figure 1 
illustrates these factors and how they ultimately influence the fit of 
an MDS solution (described later). 
 
 Adaptation in this case captures any increase in familiarity with 
the range of stimuli being rated or the rating scale. The main effect 
of adaptation should be to increase or decrease the simplicity 
(complexity) of the subjects’ cognitive representations and resulting 
judgments. Importantly, adaptation should occur very early for the 
familiar packaged goods used in our study (e.g., beverages and snack 
foods). It should also be minimized through prior exposure to the 
scale and stimulus set. In following this procedure, our experience is 
that subjects do adapt very quickly and easily to such a task. 
 Any subsequent change in the 
subjects approach to the task 
should reflect fatigue or some 
closely related construct. In fact, 
we may have captured the effect of 
boredom as much as fatigue, but 
clearly fatigue is a common 
reaction to boredom and may be 
treated as synonymous for our 
purposes. The subjects in our task 
provided 66 paired comparison 
similarity judgments. It seems 
obvious that such a task is boring 
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and tedious and likely to lead to reduced attention and effort. All we 
presume is that a comparison of later judgments with earlier judgments 
should reflect fatigue. Although more direct measures of fatigue are 
desirable, we feel that our conceptualization of the task environment 
is sound. Whether learning occurs seems more problematic. Subjects 
were aware in advance of the 12 familiar products to be rated and were 
provided no response feedback during the course of the task. 
 
3. Revised fatigue hypotheses 
 
 We argue that one natural response to fatigue is to adopt simpler 
cognitive representations and rely on basic level category 
similarities and differences to finish the rating task. When a 
stimulus set crosses basic level category boundaries, this results in 
an increase in judgment variance over time. Thus we state: “When 
judging products from a more superordinate level, involving more than 
one traditional category or basic level distinction (e.g., beverages), 
judgment variance should increase as subjects progress through the 
task.” (p. 37) 
 As a simple example, consider four of our beverage stimuli: soft 
drink, diet soft drink, milk, and chocolate milk. These stimuli cross 
the soft drink and milk product categories. Early in a proximity 
judgment task, consumers are more likely to consider similarities 
across the categories (e.g., both the chocolate milk and the soft 
drinks are sweet). They are also more likely to consider differences 
within the categories (e.g., the diet versus non-diet nature of the 
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soft drinks). As the task drags on, the consumer is likely to focus 
more exclusively on basic level category membership (e.g., soft drink 
products versus milk products). Within the soft drink and milk product 
categories, products should be judged as more similar. Across these 
categories, products should be judged as more dissimilar. Thus we 
predict that judgment variance increases for our category level 
stimuli. 
 The proposed alternative interpretation of our categorization 
framework introduces an important restriction on the task environment 
which results in a very different prediction. It presumes that each 
category level stimulus represents a separate and distinct basic level 
category. Thus when subjects come to rely more on similarities and 
differences in category membership, there are no salient similarities 
to consider; the stimuli should become more universally dissimilar. 
However, this argument and revised fatigue hypotheses FH1 and FH3 
apply more to those situations where each category level stimulus is 
drawn from a distinctly different category. 
 This does point out how the predictions of a categorization 
framework depend on the nature of the stimulus set. Yet our discussion 
and empirical study focus on products that cross category boundaries 
rather than represent completely separate basic level categories. As a 
result, our initial hypothesis HI is correct for our study and 
stimuli. Importantly, the type of stimuli underlying revised 
hypotheses FH1 and FH3 appear to represent the exception rather than 
the rule for category level judgment tasks. 
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 Our second hypothesis (H2) states that the fit of scaling 
techniques should improve as consumers progress through a similarity 
rating task for both brand and category level stimuli. As shown in 
Fig. 1, scaling fits should improve as consumers adopt simpler 
cognitive representations in response to fatigue. This follows 
directly from our categorization framework. An alternative argument, 
mentioned in our paper and captured in Fig. 1, is that subjects may 
become careless in response to fatigue. This would cause an increase 
in error variance and a resulting decrease in the fit of scaling 
techniques (i.e., revised hypothesis FH2). Notably, this argument is 
not based on categorization. The two arguments represent qualitatively 
different, though not mutually exclusive, ways in which fatigue may 
affect judgments. 
 It is inappropriate to associate the “careless judgment” or error 
variance argument with our “simple judgment” or cognitive 
categorization argument. Our initial hypothesis H2 is consistent with 
our overall view that subjects respond to fatigue by relying on 
simpler, more categorical representations. We also fail to see the 
relevance of work on simple versus complex individuals, a between-sub- 
jects variable, on our within-subjects analysis. In our case, the fit 
of an MDS routine is used mainly as an indicator of the dimensionality 
or complexity of a cognitive representation. 
 
4. Alternative explanation based on learning 
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 Our predictions and results are consistent with a categorization 
perspective. Keep in mind that there are no empirical findings for 
which some alternative explanation can not be produced. However, our 
findings are more difficult to explain within a learning framework. 
The proposed learning framework presumes that the focus of category 
learning is on common features. This is an overly micro view of the 
categorization process. More generally, categorization is on ongoing 
process of grouping and distinguishing which occurs at both 
subordinate and superordinate category levels (Murphy and Medin, 
1985). 
 The learning explanation also presumes that our data was 
collected with a primary emphasis on similarities or common features. 
As mentioned in our article, however, we actually used a neutral 
similarity-dissimilarity scale (scale ranged from very dissimilar to 
very similar). This was by design. Research suggests that a strictly 
similarity-oriented scale increases the salience of common product 
features while a dissimilarity-oriented scale increases the salience 
of distinctive product features (Johnson, 1986). Therefore, we 
employed a scale that emphasized both common and distinctive features. 
 The common features assumption underlying the learning 
explanation and hypotheses seems inappropriate in our subjects’ task 
environment. Indeed, learning hypothesis LH3 suggests that mean 
similarity judgments should increase, which is inconsistent with the 
reported results. Thus, the data appears to reject the learning 
explanation. 
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 The question of just when learning takes place and when fatigue 
or boredom occurs in a similarity judgment task is indeed an open 
issue. In closing we re-iterate Brunswik’s (1956) observation with 
regard to psychological interpretations of research results. Any 
alternative view or explanation must take the task environment into 
consideration. Our task environment involved repeated judgments among 
familiar products. To suggest that our results represent learning 
rather than a response to fatigue ignores this basic observation 
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